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THE LINCOLN ELECTRIC COMPANY CASE*
A "REASONABLE" TAX DEDUCTION MAY BE A
SURREPTITIOUS STRIDE TOWARD TOTALITARIANISM
WIRT PETERS **
Most of us are accustomed to accepting taxes, particularly income
taxes, as simply a necessary revenue-raising expediency of the government.
With a taxpayer's incipient naivete we confidently believe that the administra-
tion of the revenue laws is an independent activity entirely unaffected by any
party's political theories or social policies. As an average citizen we will not
be easily persuaded that an obscure insituation of a single idea into a brief
phrase of the tax statute, especially the interpolation of such an innocuous
word as reasonable, possibly could be tremendously significant with many,
perhaps insidious, implications.
Whenever any consideration is given to any of the other possible aspects
of taxation it is usually the general econonic results which receive the most
attention, such as the abstract effect of taxes upon profits, prices, or wages,
and upon theoretical business conditions prospectively. Occasionally, taxes
are discussed in their relation to political concepts, and less frequently with
reference to social consequences. However, when these possibilities are ex-
plored it is usually with hypothetical situations and in the general terms of
broad principles. We, nevertheless, nonchalantly believe that if some specific
result is desired or a particular policy is to be pursued it will be accomplished
publicly and deliberately in the Halls of Congress by the duly elected repre-
sentatives of a sovereign people.
Seldom has it been possible to consider so many significant implications
in connection with the decision of a single comparatively obscure issue as is
now presented by the case of The Lincoln Electric Company.
B3ACKGROUND OF THE CASE
The Lincoln Electric Company manufactures and sells electric arc weld-
ing machines, electrodes and weldting supplies, with its office and plant in
Cleveland, Ohio.
In 1934. in discussion with its employees, there emerged a proposal
for an annual boiius. Eighty-five percent oi the employees operate on a piece-
work rate, scientifically ascertained, fixed and guaranteed for each year and
* Commissioner v. Lincoln Electric Co. C. A. 6th no. 10728, Aug. 29, 1949. 1949
P-H, Vol. 5, Par. 72585.
** Professor of Law, University of Miami; member of the Oklahoma and Illinois
Bars and Society of Certified Public Accountants.
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the employee is paid in accord with what he produces, without restriction upon
the amount of his production. The base pay of other employees whose
duties are not susceptible of piecework treatment is the same or slightly higher
than the prevailing wage rate paid by manufacturing industries in the con-
nmunity for similar services. In 1940 the cash bonus paid the employees ap-
proximated 100o of their base pay, about a year's wages.
In 1936, at the suggestion of the Employees' Advisory Board, the com-
pany added an employees' retirement annuity policy which was purchased
from the Sun Life Insurance Company of Canada and premiums were paid
annually after 1936, $400,000 being paid in the year 1940.
By these incentive provisions the company has avoided work stoppages
and other labor troubles. The undisputed evidence shows that in the eight
year period ending in 1941 the productivity of the individual employee.
measured in terms of units produced, increased more thian threefold, the
hours of direct labor required to manufacture a given unit was cut in half,
the selling price of its product was reduced by nearly one-half, the dividends
per share of stock were more than tripled and the earned surplus and itii-
divided profits doubled.
The Independence Day issue of Newsweek.' carried an article on
The Lincoln Electric Company summarizing the company's growth and
concluding that the bonus system ". . . marked the start of one of the most
controversial labor-relations techniques of recent times. Results have been
multiple:
"Lincoln Electric, in union-conscious Cleveland, is completely open shop.
'I've never done anything to fight unions,' Lincoln has said, 'but what have
my workers to gain by joining a union?
"Various government agencies have attacked the personnel policies of
Lincoln, charging paternalism and tax dodging, among other things. This
has turned Lincoln into one of the harshest critics of the New Deal and a_
rabid spokesman for free enterprise. He speaks frequently on such subjects.
writes letters to editors, and makes his views known by word of mouth."
TnE TAX PROBLEM PRESENTED
In its Federal income tax return for 1940 the company deducted from
its gross income in determining the amount of its net income upon which
the tax was to be computed, the premium paid during the year for the em-
ployees' retirement annuity policy in the amount of $400,008.84. A similar
deduction for the premium paid in each of the years 1936 through 1939 had
been used in computing the tax net income of the company and has not been
questioned by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. But, for the year 1940
1. Ncwswek, July 4, 1949, p. 61.
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the deduction was disallowed and additional tax assessed, the deficiency notice
explained that the amount of the premium was ". .. not an allowable deduction
within the provisions of Section 23 of the Internal Revenue Code." The con-
tested issue, then, is whether the taxpayer is entitled to the deduction either
as additional compensation paid for services actually rendered or as an ordi-
nary and necessary business expense, or not at all.
The applicable statute 2 provides, in part, that in computing the net in-
come of a taxpayer for income tax purposes there shall be allowed as deduc-
tions from gross income:
"All the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during
the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business. including a reasonable
allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal services actually
rendered . . ." (emphasis added).
By way of parenthetical explanation, one who is not particularly con-
versant with the interpretation of tax statutes might believe that according
to the ordinary rules of language structure and statutory construction Con-
gress originally might have intended to allow the deduction of all ordinary
expenses even though not absolutely necessary, and also all necessary
expenses even though not ordinary. But, inasmuch as deductions from gross
income have been held to be matters of legislative grace.8 the statute has been
construed strictly against the taxpayer to require an expense to be both
ordinary and necessary. Although this alone seems to be a considerable
constriction of business expenses which are to be allowed as deductions for tax
purposes, with a corresponding limitation upon a businessman's free judg-
ment as to the imporiance of expenditures, the citations on this point are
legion and any disagreement fow can be hut argumentative.
TTnE COURTS' INTERPRETATIONS
A. The Tax Court's First Decision 4
In the first hearing of the case before the Tax Court the company pro-
tested the Commissioner's assessment of additional tax and contended that
the amount paid for the purchase of the annuity contracts was properly
deductible in the computation of its net income for tax purposes either (a)
as compensation paid for personal services actually rendered, or (b) if not
2. 52 STAT. 460 (1938), 26 U. S. C. § 23(a) (1) (A) (1946).
3. But see An Argument Against The Doctrine That Deductions Should Be Nar-
rowly Construed As A Matter Of Legislative Grace, 56 HARv. L. REv. 1142 (1943):
"The matter of a fair allowance of deductions becomes of crucial importance with tax
rates at their present level, and it is as much to the interest of the Government as it is
of Taxpayers to see that taxes are not imposed on what is not in any fair sense net
income of the taxpayer."
4. The Lincoln Electric Company. Petitioner, v. Coniinissioner of Internal Revenue.
Respondent. 6 TC 37 (1947).
THE LINCOLN ELECTRIC COMPANY CASE 15
as that, then as an ordinary and necessary expense of carrying on its business.
(a) In the opinion of the court the amount of the premium was not
allowable as a deduction 'on the basis of compensation for several reasons:
First, it was not compensation for services rendered, for neither the employee
nor his estate would be entitled to receive anything of value in the future un-
less he remained in the employ of petitioner and rendered service in that em-
ployment over a long term of years. Second, there is an inference in the statute
that in order for an expenditure to be deductible as compensation it must have
been paid to the employee, the court believing that there must be an immediate
correspondence between the deduction by one taxpayer and the taxability
to another. Third, the payments were made voluntarily and not pursuant
either to a prior agreement or enforceable obligation.
Having held for a variety of reasons that the payment did not qualify
as compensation" the court had no occasion to pass on the question of
reasonableness, for in view of the conclusion that the disbursements in dispute
did not constitute compensation paid for services rendered, any question of
their reasonableness becomes moot.
(b) This brings us to a consideration of petitioner's further contention
that the disbursements are deductible as ordinary and necessary business
expenses in that they constitute a cost of maintaining an incentive plan or
program. The court then summarily dismissed the argument that the dis-
bursement was ordinary, and says that even if it were ordinary that
"necessary" means more than commendable on the part of the employer and
generally beneficial to him. The fact that voluntary payments are necessary
for the development of the taxpayer's business in the sense that they are
appropriate and helpful does not establish them as necessary within the purview
of the statute. In fact, inasmuch as the payments were for services, although
falling ouside the field of allowable compensation deductions, they may not,
therefore, be deducted as ordinary and necessary expenses.
B. The First Appeal to the Circuit Court --
On the first appeal the circuit court conceded that the premium pay-
ments sought to be deducted were expenses, the taxpayer paid out its
money and under no circumstances could it get any of it back, and that the
question was only whether they were ordinary and necessary within the Act.
The incentive plan adopted by the taxpayer was not extraordinary in the
community. As industrial units grow the greater becomes the injury that
might flow from labor strife and the greater becomes the necessity for man-
agement to seek means to avoid it. The court concluded that, in the light of the
concept of ordinary expense developed by Mr. Justice Cardozo.6 it was
S. Lincoln Electric Co. v. Commissioner of iteriaI Revenue, 162 F.2d 379 (C. C. A.
6th 147).
6. In Welch v. Helveriig, 290 U. S. 111 (1933).
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unable to say that the petitioner's outlay for em1ployee benefit, considering its
purpose and the clearly demonstrated effectuation of that purpose through
a course of years, was not an ordinary expenditure within the meaning of
the statute.
Now, if the expenditure reasonably constitutes an ordinary and necessary
expense, it will not be necessary to consider whether it is an allowable de-
duction as compensation for personal services. In any event the court is
not obliged to determine reasonableness as that is concededly within the
exclusive province of the Tax Court and it has given no consideration to it
in view of its decision that the payments were not allowable deductions for
compensation nor as ordinary and necessary expenses. Accordingly, the case
was remanded to the Tax Court for disposition in conformity with this
decision.
C. The Tax Court's Second Opinion T
The second time before the Tax Court, the Commissioner contended that
the circuit court having decided that the payments were ordinary and necessary
.expenses but having refused to consider the question of whether they rep-
resented compensation, and, if so, reasonable, that this court now has juris-
diction to pass upon that issue, i.e., the reasonableness of the payments as
compensation.
But, it seemed clear to the court that the expenditures had been de-
termined to be allowable deductions as ordinary and necessary expenses under
the general provision of the Act regardless of whether when tested under the
specific provision of the statute they might still be found to be unreasonable-
compensation. Accordingly, the Tax Court did not believe it necessary to
consider any question of the reasonableness of the contested payments. The
Commissioner then appealed this decisiqn.
D. The Second Appeal to the Circuit Court
On the second appeal to the circuit court the court found it necessary to.
interpret its first opinion, explaining that the deduction authorized on the,
first appeal was based on the broader ground of ordinary and necessary
expenses, which would include items not of a compensatory nature, such
as rent, advertising, transportation and communication charges, repairs and.
other operating charges. Such payments are made proper deductions by the
statute, but with respect to them there is no express provision limiting them
to a reasonable amount, as there is in the case of payments of compensation.
7. The Lincoln Electric Co. 1947 P-H TC Memorandum Decisions 47,321.
8. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. The Lincoln Electric Co. 1949 P-11, Vol.
5, Par. 72,585.
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However, the element of reasonableness is inherent in the phrase "ordinary and
necessary." The taxpayer, and the Tax Court, are incorrect, the court said,
in contending that the holding was that the payments were ordinary and
necessary expenses and, therefore, deductible in full. The taxpayer has
requested a rehearing.
A FIRST RESTATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
With this background of the case and the extended story of the interpre-
tation of section 23(a) (1) Internal Revenue Code now before us we should
restate the issue and consider it for ourselves de nova:
MUST "ORDINARY AND NECESSARY" EXPENSES
ALSO BE "REASONABLE" f
Historically, the original income tax acts provided for the deduction of
ordinary and necessary expenses. It was Trot until the Revenue Act of 1918
that the revision written into the statute provided for "reasonable" compen-
sation and the Act has remained unchanged since that time. Obviously,
Congress thought that it had not already provided the idea of reasonableness
in connection with ordinary and necessary expenses, and that in the revision
it was changing the limits of the allowable deduction for only one item:
salaries. By thus revising one specific deduction it must have been the in-
tention not to change any of the other deductions. Even if deductions generally
are admitted to be matters of legislative grace, such a revision must be con-
strued strictly, and fairly, against the government.
Moreover, for thirty years taxpayers and their counsel have operated
their businesses in the belief that if they could demonstrate that an expense
was ordinary and necessary to their business, a sufficiently difficult job in
itself, they would not also have to sustain the burden of proving its reason-
ableness. With this belief the government apparently concurred, as evidenced
by the lack of cases on the point. After this period of acceptance, the entire
life of the Income Tax, even if it now is to be said that Congress intended
the words "ordinary and necessary" to imply "reasonableness" it should be
a matter of legislative determination whether to enforce that intent by revising
the provision so as not to leave anything to implication.
A SECOND RESTATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
As an abstract principle we might be able to accept the proposition that
ordinary and necessary expenses should also be reasonable in amount. But,
the very statement of the principle immediately compels the question: Who
shall determine the reasonableness of a business expense? Inasmuch as tax-
1If1A3I LAI! QUARTERLY
ation is not abstract, practical considerations necessitate a restatement of the
issue:
SHALL THE JUDGMENT OF A GOVERNM1ENT AGENT
1BE SUBSTITUTED FOR TIE JUDGMENT OF THE BUSI-
NESSMAN IN DETERMINING THE REASONABLENESS
OF: ORDINA RY AND NECESSARY EXPENDITURES.
It will e argued, of course, that in many branches of the law the citizen
is held to a standard of reasonable conduct; even in other sections of the tax
statute certain deductions must be reasonable, and, the court must fre-
quently determine what is reasonable: in fact, the court has frequently had
to determine what is reasonable compensation ever since that provision was
first enacted. It will be said that the government will be liberal in the ad-
ministration of this new interpretation, and further, that having the court
as the final arbiter will effectively shield the taxpayer from any possibly UN-
reasonable action. It may even be admitted, for the sake of argument, that
all these things are true, but this is still an entirely unsatisfactory answer to
the businessman who believes in individual initiative and comparatively free,
competitive enterprise. He is willing to assume the responsibility of attempting
to calculate the economic risks, but he must be permitted the free exercise of
his own judgment and not have also to try to anticipate what someone not
familiar with his problems may decide about the reasonableness of his decisions.
It is axiomatic that hindsight is better than foresight. Many a businessman
has regretfully looked back upon some expenditure and admitted that it had
been unwise, perhaps even foolish now that the consequences have become
apparent, so was it not thereby also "unreasonable"? Even at the tine of the
expenditure there might be a difference of opinion; boards of directors are not
always unanimous in their authorization or approval. In all these situations
then, when a tax return is audited by a government agent two or three years
after the fact, is it going to require an appeal to the court from the agent's
finding of "unreasonableness" in order to get the expense allowed as a de-
duction?
Of course, it is assumed that no one %will maintain that a businessman
can make his decisions without considering the effect of taxation. If the
impact of the tax is comparatively certain it can be taken into account as one
of the known factors in the calculated risk of doing business. But, a business-
man should not be additionally burdened with the uncertainty of even a.
possible disallowance of an expenditure merely upon a difference of opinion:
as to what is reasonable in amount. The disallowance of a deduction of an
expense which in his best judgment lie believed ordinary and necessary to the
successful management of his business at the time of the expenditure, with the
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consequent assessment of additional tax, might easily convert an ostensible
profit for the year into a subsequently determined actual loss.
For example: suppose The Lincoln Electric Company's net income
before taxes but after deducting $400,000 for premiums paid on annuity
policies was $50,000. and that the cash on hand was $50,000. The tax at
38o would be $19,000, leaving an actual profit of $31,000. Now, if the
$400,000 is subsequently disallowed as having been unreasonable, although
actually expended, the tax would be calculated on $450,000, which at 38%
is $171,000 thus leaving an actual accounting loss and a cash deficit of
$121,000.
The results of this example would, of course, follow the disallowance
of a deduction, under the assumed facts, for any reason. But, such results
should not be possible simply upon a bona-fide difference of opinion as to
what is the reasonable amount of an ordinary and necessary expense. Further,
inasmuch as a difference of opinion is possible, suppose that the government
agent auditing the tax return of a competitor of Lincoln Electric under exactly
the same circumstances did not believe the expense to be unreasonable and
did not disallow the deduction. Result: Lincoln Electric's loss $121,000,
Competitor's profit $31,000. Should this condition be charged to the manage-
ment, as the stockholders are apt to do after comparing the published results
of the operations of the competing companies?
But there is still another dilemma facing the businessman. Even though
it appeared that the company had a profit of $31,000 out of which it could
pay dividends, would it not be unwise to do so until the tax return for that
year was passed and it was finally determined that no deductions were going
to be disallowed because they were unreasonable? So, if no deductions were
disallowed then obviously the dividends should have been paid and the
company was unreasonable in withholding the distribution from its stock-
holders. Thus, in failing to pay out the dividends the company becomes subject
to the penalty tax 9 for the unreasonable accunmulation of surplus, together
with possible further stockholder actions.
A FINAL RESTATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
And so, the issue gradually clarifies: it obviously is not simply whether
a business expense must be reasonable as well as ordinary and necessary:
nor is it only one of determining whose judgment shall control the question
of reasonableness. It is submitted that the basic issue, the fundamental
principle, should be definitely and plainly stated thus:
9. 52 STAT. 483 (1938). 26 U. S. C. § 102 (1946).
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ARE IWE TO ABANDON FREE ENTERPRISE AS AN
AMERICAN PRINCIPLE IN FAVOR OF COMPLETE GOV
ERNMENTAL CONTROL?
Your answer to this restatement of the issue will depend not so much
on rules of statutory construction as upon your political and social theories
and economic concepts. "No one can rightly claim that he should not be
regulated in the public interest, or taxed to support necessary government
activities." But, fundamentally, free enterprise "is the right of any man to
engage in any occupation or business he wants to engage in and to run it
as lie sees fit so long as he doesn't interfere with the right of others to do
the same.
"The great war of ideas today not only in this country but throughout
the world is that of the liberty of the individual against the all-power-
fil totalitarian state, regulating and directing the lives of its citizens.
Economic liberty and the liberty of the individual to conduct his own business
affairs is only one featurem-but an essential feature---of that over-all liberty
which permits people to live as they wish to live, which permits people to
think as they wish to think, which guarantees religious freedom and freedom
of thought, in our churches and in our universities. It is part of the general
liberty which permits each community to govern itself in all those matters
where it does not interfere with the freedom of other communities." "0
A CONCLUDING PROGNOSIS
The decision in The Lincoln Electric Company case applies the term
.reasonable" only to the business expenses covered by section 23(a)(1).
However, section 23(a) (2) provides for the deduction of:
(2) Non-trade or non-business expenses.
In the case of an individual, all the ordinary and necessary expenses
paid or incurred during the taxable year for the production or collection
of income, or for the management, conservation, or maintenance of prop-
erty held for the production of income. (Emphasis added.)
If "ordinary and necessary" implies "reasonable" in section 23(a)(1) is
not the same implication inherent in the same phrase when used in the next
paragraph of the same subsection, section 23(a) (2) ? The Commissioner has
already included the idea in the Regulations covering the second paragraph."
With the sanction of this present 'decision the administration of "reasonable"
expenses can now be stepped up.
10. How Much Government Can Free Enterprise Stand? by U. S. Senator Robert
A. Taft. Collier's, October 22, 1949, p. 16.
11. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Regulations I1l, 29.23(a)-15(2).
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If you find it necessary to travel in order to manage property and you stay
at a hotel where the rate is $7.00 a day, you might find that the expense would
be determined to have been unreasonable in amount because there were hotel
rooms available for less. Then would it be any greater step to apply the same
qualification to the other subsections of the same section? Perhaps, then,
it might be found unreasonable for one of your political persuasion, in your
social position, to incur medical expenses in a hospital with an obstetrician
for your wife, you should have sent for your mother-in-law. You will, of
course, object that these illustrations are too extravagant, but a step has been
taken in the case we have under review, and there is much more to the ad-
ministration of a revenue act than merely the raising of money.
By the rules of statutory construction it appears that the court has
unduly extended the scope of the statute. In any event, the interpretation at
this late date which so extends the application has such foreboding practical
results that the change should not be made without an adequate public
awareness and the opportunity for a legislative expression.
